Derecho penal y exclusión social (Luis A. Zambrana)

» Derecho penal y exclusión social:

… cualquier explicación del castigo que
pretenda darle un lugar central a la
reflexión sobre la justicia de la pena
que se le impone al ofensor debe
enfrentar el problema de si podemos
castigar de modo justo a sujetos cuyas
ofensas se encuentran íntimamente
asociadas con injusticias sociales
serias que ellos han sufrido.
(Duff, 1998, p. 197)

....¿En realidad el Derecho penal en nuestras sociedades contemporáneas se encuentra dirigido a toda la ciudadanía? Así debería serlo en una sociedad efectivamente democrática, ¿pero lo es así en una sociedad altamente violenta y peligrosamente desigual como es la puertorriqueña?¿Cuán legítimo es que el Estado castigue a una persona que poco o nada tuvo que ver con la creación de ese difícil entramado de normas que caracterizan el Derecho penal?

Estas, entre tantas otras, son preguntas básicas que debemos hacernos en una sociedad puertorriqueña que por décadas se ha encontrado inmersa en un patrón de sobre-utilización del Derecho penal como paliativo ante las graves contradicciones que nuestra sociedad crea, desarrolla y perpetúa. De esta manera, seguimos viendo cómo asuntos estructurales tan importantes como es la constatación de una enorme y creciente desigualdad socio-económica en la Isla son sustituidos por discursos propios de un populismo penal irresponsable, contraproducente y radicalmente injusto. Continuamos padeciendo los insufribles programas de aumento de penas, de delitos, de peores condiciones de cumplimiento de sentencia, de más severidad en las formas de infligir castigo y de un peligroso simplismo institucional que contribuye al error garrafal de pensar que, mientras más ámbitos y actividades del ser humano colonice el Derecho penal, tendremos una sociedad menos violenta y más segura.

Ante este panorama, es ingenuo pensar que ese Derecho penal cada vez más voluminoso y draconiano se dirige de forma general a todos los sectores sociales en Puerto Rico. Esto nos lleva necesariamente a reflexionar brevemente sobre tres asuntos medulares en materia de Derecho penal y justicia social: (1) a quiénes –o a qué sectores sociales- efectivamente se dirige el Derecho penal como forma estatal de reproche y castigo altamente severo; (2) qué proceso político se utiliza para la creación y desarrollo de normas penales, así como el modelo de democracia que lo inspira, y (3) a raíz de las conclusiones que hayamos realizado en virtud de las primeras reflexiones, ¿es legítimo que nuestro Estado castigue?

.... (Continúa Aquí).

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Segundo Ciclo de Grupos de Estudio: Teoría de la Pena

Este jueves, 12 de febrero, retomamos los Grupos de Estudio en la Escuela de Derecho de la UPR. Este ciclo tendrá como eje la Teoría de la Pena y sus sesiones serán dirigidas por el profesor Oscar Miranda-Miller. El trabajo a discutirse en cada sesión se describe a continuación y se acompaña su enlace en internet.

Primera Sesión: El retributivismo

Jueves 12 de febrero de 2015

Salón de la Facultad

12 pm – 1 pm

MICHAEL MOORE, Closet Retributivism, en PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 83 (1997), disponible en https://www.scribd.com/doc/254569953/Moore

Retributivism as a theory of punishment has enjoyed some resurgence among the legal theorists of the past thirty years—in marked contrast to the theory’s earlier decline throughout most of this century, when it was often regarded as a remnant of our barbarous past. This chapter is designed to persuade those who have not worked through any theoretical arguments in favour of retributivism how they themselves might be retributivists—closet retributivists, perhaps, but retributivists nonetheless. By “retributivist” I refer to one who believes that the justification for punishing a criminal is simply that the criminal deserves to be punished. What I mean by “closet” retributivism is a retributive theory held by those who have not thought through a theory of punishment, but who show themselves to be retributivists in the judgements they make and the reasons for which they make them. By and large I do not in this chapter attempt to show that such persons should be retributivists; only to show that they are.

Segunda Sesión: Las sanciones alternativas

Jueves 3 de marzo de 2015

L-6

12 pm – 1 pm

Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 592 (1996), disponible en https://www.scribd.com/doc/254569819/Kahan

The singularity of American criminal punishments has been widely lamented. Imprisonment is harsh and degrading for offenders and extraordinarily expensive for society. Nor is there any evidence that imprisonment is more effective than its rivals in deterring various crimes. For these reasons, theorists of widely divergent orientations--from economics-minded conservatives to reform-minded civil libertarians--are united in their support for alternative sanctions.

The problem is that there is no political constituency for such reform. If anything, the public’s commitment to imprisonment has intensified in step with the theorists’ disaffection with it. In the last decade, prison sentences have been both dramatically lengthened for many offenses and extended to others that have traditionally been punished only with fines and probation.

. . . The political unacceptability of alternative sanctions, I will argue, reflects their inadequacy along the expressive dimension of punishment. The public rejects the alternatives not because they perceive that these punishments won’t work or aren’t severe enough, but because they fail to express condemnation as dramatically and unequivocally as imprisonment.

Tercera Sesión: El hacer justicia controlando el crimen

Jueves 9 de abril de 2015

Salón de la Facultad

12 pm – 1 pm

Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L. J., 1089 (2010-2011), disponible en https://www.scribd.com/doc/254568778/Robinson

You probably remember from your first-year criminal law class the age- old tension between the retributivists who want to punish offenders because they deserve it, they see deserved punishment as a value in itself, and the utilitarians (or instrumentalists), who believe that punishment must have some more practical justification, such as avoiding future crime, perhaps through deterrence, incapacitation of the dangerous, or rehabilitation. The dispute between these two groups is classically thought to be irresolvable. The two are simply using different currencies and think different things to be important.

One of the most exciting developments in current punishment theory suggests that these two positions may not be entirely irresolvable, at least in a sense. You all know the American Law Institute and the Model Penal Code that it promulgated in 1962. Almost three-quarters of the states have since codified their criminal law in ways modeled after that code. Last year, for the first time in forty-six years, the Model Penal Code was amended to change the section setting out the purposes of the code, its provisions, and how those provisions are to be interpreted. And much of what I will talk about today is the story, in intellectual terms, of how that change in perspective came about.