“[T]his irreducibility of homo economicus to the subject of right entails an important modification with regard to the sovereign and the exercise of sovereign power. In fact, the sovereign is not in the same position vis-à-vis homo economicus as he is vis-à-vis the subject of right. The subject of right may well, at least in some conceptions and analyses appear as that which limits the exercise of sovereign power. But homo economicus is not satisfied with limiting the sovereign’s power; to a certain extent, he strips the sovereign of power. Is power removed in the name of a right that the sovereign must not touch? No, that’s not what’s involved. Homo economicus strips the sovereign power inasmuch as he reveals and essential, fundamental, and major incapacity to govern, that is to say, an inability to master the totality of economic field as a whole. The whole set of economic process cannot fail to elude a would-be central, totalizing bird’s-eye view…..I think the emergence of the notion of homo economicus represents a sort of political challenge to the traditional, juridical conception, whether absolutist or not, of the sovereign. (p. 292).
Juridical theory is unable to take on and resolve the question of how to govern in a space of sovereignty inhabited by economic subjects, since precisely (as I tried to show last week) the juridical theory of the subject of right, of natural rights, and of the granting and delegation of rights does not fit together and cannot be fitted together with the mechanical idea, the very designation and characterization of homo economicus.” (p. 294).