Este semestre daremos comienzo en la Escuela de Derecho de la UPR a un ciclo de discusión como parte de la tarea de pensar el Derecho. El 11 de septiembre daremos comienzo a lo que será una serie de Grupos de Estudio, abiertos a toda la comunidad académica. El primer tema que abordaremos por este semestre será la Teoría y la Metodología jurídica, que en principio estará a cargo del profesor Hiram Meléndez Juarbe y quien aquí escribe.
Dejo los detalles del primer y esperamos que un nutrido grupo de la comunidad académica se una. Se trata de una de varias formas de no solo pensar el Derecho sino, además, concebir nuevos imaginarios para éste. ¡Salud!.
El primer ciclo tendrá como eje Temas Recientes en Metodología y Teoría del Derecho
Primera Sesión: Legalismo Liberal, 11 de septiembre de 2014
Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law in Public Law (2014) (18 páginas). Disponible en SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
This paper explores the possibility of a conception of the rule of law that is oriented specifically to public law. It is not a conception of the rule of law that privileges private law rights (like rights of property) nor is it an abstract or anodyne conception that is supposed to apply to all areas of governance indiscriminately. Instead this is an account of the rule of law that takes the mission of public administration seriously and seeks to establish it on a footing of legality rather than managerialism, while at the same time acknowledging that sometimes private interests have to give way to the interests of the public.
Segunda Sesión: Crítica a los Derechos, 9 de octubre de 2014
Robin L. West, A Tale of Two Rights (2014) (21 páginas). Disponible en SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
In part I of this article the author identifies and criticizes a cluster of constitutional rights, which she argues does tremendous and generally unreckoned harm to civil society, and does so for reasons poorly articulated in earlier critiques. At the heart of the new paradigm of constitutional rights that the author believes these rights exemplify is a "right to exit." On this conception of individual rights, a constitutional right is a right to "opt out" of some central public or civic project. This understanding of what it means to have a constitutional right hit the scene a good two decades after civic republicans and critical legal theorists mostly had formed their respective critiques of individual rights. Consequently, such thinkers failed to incorporate the notion of constitutional rights into their critiques. The particular exit rights that she enumerates – that is, the rights to exit from the benefits and responsibilities of public projects, including public education, publicly funded policing, civil rights commitments, and public health projects – harm civil society in profound ways not appreciated by rights critics in the 1970s and 1980s. The harm these rights do, the author states, borrowing language from the title of Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein’s recent book, has turned out to be even worse than it might have seemed in the heyday of our rights critiques. The author urges a reinvigorated rights critique that centers on these new rights and new harms.
In part II the author discusses a countertrend: the expansion of civil rights beyond those enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Some of our most newly created civil rights, generally created by Congress and state legislatures rather than announced by courts, in effect extend to individuals various rights to enter civil society, or some civil project close to its core. She calls these civil rights "rights to enter"– these include, for example, the right to a high quality and public education, the right to purchase health insurance at affordable costs, the right to a safe home and neighborhood free of gun violence, the right to nurture a newborn or sick family member while not losing one’s job, the right to marry whom one loves regardless of sex, and the right to work and school environments free of discriminatory animus. All of these civil rights, imperfectly recognized in various statutes, invite participation in some core sphere of civil society: education, insurance markets, neighborhoods, family, marriage, or employment. These civil "rights to enter," which stand in contrast to constitutional "rights to exit," exemplify both an old idea that dates back to the early days of the republic, and a new idea that invites participation in a radically transformed civil society. Not only are these rights not harmful to civil society, they are integral to it.
The author states that, generally, civil rights to enter are clearly not buttressed by constitutional rights to exit, and increasingly are threatened by them. First, both our historical and more modern civil rights to enter civil society – the various civil rights won in the nineteenth century by freed slaves and wives, and in the twentieth century by racial and religious minorities; women; the disabled; the elderly; school children; gay, lesbian and transgendered citizens; laborers; economically struggling parents; and the victims of hate crimes and private and domestic violence – are not constitutional rights at all, and for the most part the courts have declared as much. Although there exists a civil right to these societal benefits, there is no clearly defined constitutional right to an adequate public education, to a police force, to some measure of health care, to be free of private discrimination in employment, to safe and fairly remunerated labor, or to help with child care while employed. All of these rights, however, are at least arguably civil rights. And some of them are core civil rights. But increasingly the Constitution not only fails to protect these civil rights but also threatens to undermine them, insofar as it grants individuals and corporations the right to exit precisely those civil projects and legal institutions that civil rights seek to guarantee others the right to enter. Civil rights and constitutional rights are thus decidedly not co-constitutive of a unified constitutional tradition, or of an articulable American identity, or a distinctively American conception of the nature of rights. Rather, civil rights and constitutional rights are on a collision course.
In both parts the author suggests that the almost ten-year-old constitutionally grounded, individual right to bear arms, particularly when combined with the broadened understanding of self-defense embodied in "stand your ground" laws, jointly constitute a paradigmatic, and maybe the paradigmatic, "exit right." By contrast, the civil rights to physical security, and to state protection against private violence that interrupts it, are at least as old as the Constitution itself, and exemplify the civil rights paradigm that she tries to describe: the right to state protection against private violence is the quintessential and foundational "right to enter." The author concludes with the observation that, while the constitutional right to own and use a gun and the civil right to protection from the state against private violence, are in obvious tension, the constitutional right to gun ownership recognized by the Supreme Court does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of a civil right to decent effective gun-control laws. Perhaps if we could spark a renewed civil rights movement, aimed at legislative activism rather than judicial activism, we might inspire a lawful and politically salient civil response to the threats to our safety and the tears to our social fabric that are occasioned by the Court’s newfound constitutional right to own and use lethal weapons. The same may also be true more broadly. The author’s general conclusion is that the way to repair the damage done to civil society by constitutional exit rights might be simply to reinvigorate our civil rights agenda.
Tercera Sesión: Derecho y Análisis Económico, 13 de noviembre de 2014
Neil Siegel, Collective Action Federalism and Its Discontents (2013) (31 páginas). Disponible en http://ssrn.com/abstract=
An increasing number of scholars argue that the Commerce Clause is best read in light of the collective action problems that the nation faced under the Articles of Confederation. The work of these “collective action theorists” is reflected in Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. Writing for four Justices, she stressed the “collective-action impasse” at the state level to which the Affordable Care Act responds.
In its purest form, a collective action approach maintains that the existence of a significant problem of collective action facing two or more states is both necessary and sufficient for Congress to address the problem by relying on the Commerce Clause. Unlike nationalist defenders of unlimited federal commerce power, a collective action approach does not ask whether the regulated conduct substantially affects interstate commerce in the aggregate. Unlike federalist defenders of limited federal commerce power, a collective action approach does not focus on the distinction between economic and noneconomic conduct, or between regulating and requiring commerce.
Accordingly, nationalists may agree that a collective action problem is sufficient for Congress to invoke the Commerce Clause, but they will disagree that it is necessary. By contrast, federalists may agree that a collective action problem is necessary for Congress to invoke the Commerce Clause, but they will disagree that it is sufficient.
This Essay anticipates such criticism. Regarding the nationalist critique of a collective action approach, I argue that the nationalist “substantial effects” test imposes no judicially enforceable limits on the scope of the Commerce Clause. I also argue that nationalists may define multistate collective action problems too narrowly. In addition to races to the bottom, collective action problems include interstate externalities that do not cause races to the bottom.
Broadening the definition of multistate collective action problems to include interstate externalities gives rise to the federalist objection that every subject Congress might want to address can plausibly be described as a collective action problem. Federalists may further object that the Commerce Clause is limited to “Commerce.” In response, I argue that “Commerce” is best understood broadly to encompass many social interactions outside markets, as Professors Jack Balkin and Akhil Amar have urged. I also argue that a collective action approach need not validate unlimited federal commerce power. Specifically, I identify three ways of limiting the kinds of interstate externalities that justify use of the Commerce Clause.